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INTRODUCTION
In June 2013, Americans were stunned to discover that the
government was spying on their Internet activities.1
Edward
Snowden, a former National Security Administration (NSA)
contractor,2 initially revealed to The Guardian, a national British
daily newspaper, that the NSA was using a program called Prism to
gain access to Americans’ emails and online data through their
Internet service providers (ISPs).3 Specifically, the NSA was using
1. See Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Ex-Worker at C.I.A. Says He
Leaked Data on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/06/10/us/former-cia-worker-says-he-leaked-surveillance-data.html;
Charlie
Savage et al., U.S. Confirms That It Gathers Online Data Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, June
6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/us/nsa-verizon-calls.html.
2. See Mazzetti & Schmidt, supra note 1.
3. See Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to
User Data of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN, June 7, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data. The Prism
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this program to tap into the central servers of several leading U.S.
Internet companies, extracting private audio and video chats,
photographs, e-mails and other documents stored online.4
While the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),5 which
allows the NSA to conduct surveillance on matters of foreign
intelligence,6 is the statute at the heart of the scandal, the debate that
the scandal has generated about government surveillance also draws
attention to problems in our domestic surveillance laws. Our
domestic surveillance laws, which exist both on the federal and state
level, provide for government surveillance of American citizens by
law enforcement officials. The current legal framework, enacted on
the federal level and copied in many states, is significantly outdated
and therefore woefully inadequate to protect Americans’ privacy in
modern communications like email and text messaging.
Specifically, the current federal statute, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)7 was enacted in 1986, when the
Internet was still in its infancy.8 As a result, protection of stored email and text messages is so weak today that government officials are
often able to access thousands of these private communications
without a showing of probable cause.9 This weakness is true on the
federal level and in many states. This Note focuses on New York’s
surveillance framework, which tracks the ECPA, pointing out
weaknesses in New York’s framework with respect to government
access to stored electronic communications like text-messages and
emails.

program allows the NSA to collect the communications of users of these ISPs. Under
the governing law, the NSA can gain access to accounts of users who live outside the
United States. The NSA can also access the accounts of Americans whose
communications include people outside the United States.
4. See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data
from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST, June 6,
2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-datafrom-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html.
5. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–12 (Supp. 2011).
6. See id.
7. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22, 2701–12,
3121–27 (2012).
8. See generally William Robison, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing
Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195 (2010).
9. See generally United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
Specifically, the Stored Communications Act allows government access to certain
stored electronic communications if the government simply procures a court order or
subpoena. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
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Given the growing prevalence of and reliance upon these modes of
communication, government access to these messages upon such a
low showing is troubling to say the least. In fact, today many
Americans prefer to communicate via email or text message over
other communication mediums. Specifically, one recent study found
that young adults connect just as often through electronic
communications as they do in-person.10 Similarly, in 2011 thirty-one
percent of text message users stated that they preferred texting to
speaking on the phone.11 The irony of these statistics is that
Americans’ in-person conversations or telephone conversations are
much more protected from government intrusion than electronic
communications.12 Even though Americans are beginning to use
electronic modes of communication more often and to convey the
same information as they have traditionally conveyed in-person or via
telephone, those electronic messages are more vulnerable to
government surveillance.
At this point, many readers might respond, “So what? If the
government has to read my emails or texts in order to prevent acts of
violence or terrorism, that’s ok with me. I have nothing to hide. I will
gladly surrender my privacy if it means that Americans are safe.”
These readers are not wrong. It is about balance. It is about
determining when the government can violate an individual’s privacy
rights in order to prevent and investigate crime. The current legal
framework fails to strike the right balance. The following examples
will demonstrate the dangers posed by the law’s weaknesses.13
Joe Smith is an upstanding citizen and pillar of his community. He
is married to a well-respected woman and is a father to three children.
Unfortunately, Joe’s brother, Dave, has gotten mixed up in organized
crime. Dave had agreed to be a witness for the prosecution in an
upcoming trial against a mob boss but has since disappeared. The
prosecution is desperate to find him. Convinced that he ran away and
that his brother is sure to have knowledge of his whereabouts, the
government gets a court order to search Joe’s emails and text
messages. The messages do not reveal any information about Dave’s
location but they do reveal a series of explicit exchanges between Joe

10. See generally JON D. MILLER, UNIV. OF MICH., THE GENERATION X REPORT
(2013).
11. PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS AND TEXT MESSAGING 1 (2011).
12. See infra Part I.C. and Part I.D.
13. These examples are hypothetical, created by the author for the purpose of
demonstrating potential situations where the failings in the law could have real-life
consequences for innocent individuals.
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and several women. Still convinced that Joe knows the location of a
vital witness, the prosecution approaches him with their new
information, threatening to expose the affair if Joe does not
cooperate with the prosecution.
Additionally, consider Amy Miller. Amy is a single woman in her
late twenties living in a small town. Amy is schizophrenic. She has
been on medication for years without an episode and prefers that her
community not know of her condition. The head of the company
where Amy works is suspected of embezzlement. Investigators, for
one reason or another, believe that Amy may have had knowledge of
her boss’s actions or even know what he did with the money. So local
law enforcement officials, many of whom Amy knows and considers
friends, get a court order for her emails and texts. The messages
reveal that Amy has schizophrenia, and soon the whole town knows
about her mental illness.
One final example14 is Michael Williams. Michael is a young
married man with a promising future. Michael is also MuslimAmerican.
State police and the FBI have been conducting
surveillance of Muslim individuals in his community ever since
September 11, 2001. Their primary source of information is
informants stationed within the Muslim communities. Investigators
obtain a court order or subpoena to access Michael’s emails and texts.
They discover a number of pornographic messages and images
exchanged between Michael and his wife before their marriage. If
exposed, these actions would destroy Michael’s reputation in the
Muslim community. Investigators then use this information to force
Michael to inform on the Muslim community.
In each of these hypothetical examples, government officials did
not have to demonstrate probable cause to obtain the users’ private
electronic correspondence. Joe’s emails and texts were searched
without a showing that law enforcement had probable cause to
believe that Joe had any knowledge of his brother’s whereabouts.
Amy’s messages were turned over despite the fact that law
enforcement could not demonstrate probable cause that she had any
knowledge of her boss’s actions. And finally, Michael’s messages
14. This example is loosely based on a recent news story. See Alastair Jamieson,
Report: NSA Spied on Porn Habits to Discredit Muslim Radicals, NBC NEWS (Nov.
27, 2013), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/11/27/21637011-report-nsa-spiedon-porn-habits-to-discredit-muslim-radicals?lite. For an in-depth look at the use of
informants by local and federal law enforcement officials in their investigations of
Muslim communities, see generally MATT APUZZO & ADAM GOLDMAN, ENEMIES
WITHIN: INSIDE THE NYPD’S SECRET SPYING UNIT AND BIN LADEN’S FINAL PLOT
AGAINST AMERICA (2013).
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were searched without any showing at all that his private information
was related to an existing criminal investigation other than his status
as a Muslim. Moreover, while law enforcement’s use of these
messages to force cooperation may verge on prosecutorial
misconduct, the intrusion itself—the reading of the private
information—is where the harm begins. These hypothetical examples
highlight the fact that many Americans today communicate very
private information via email and text message. Thus, government
access to these private communications, even without any misuse of
the information, is wrong. The intrusion upon individual privacy
rights represented by government access to these communications has
grown as society’s reliance upon electronic communication has
increased.
So what can be done to protect electronic communications? There
seem to be two options: (1) the states can wait for guidance from the
federal government via Congress or the courts, and in the meantime
continue to allow the search of citizens’ stored electronic messages
without a warrant; or (2) the state legislatures can take action. Given
that Congress has failed to enact an amendment to the ECPA despite
the fact that an amendment has been proposed in each of the last
three Congressional sessions,15 the first option could leave Americans’
privacy rights unprotected for a long time. Similarly, the Supreme
Court has failed to provide guidance16 and the lower courts are
churning out conflicting opinions that rely on outdated distinctions.17

15. A bill to amend the Electronic Communications Privacy Act was introduced
in Congress in each of the last three years. This year’s attempt is still pending in both
See H.R. 2471 (112th), GOVTRACK.US,
the
House
and
Senate.
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr2471 (last visited Mar. 15, 2014)
(showing that the 2011 bill died in the Senate after passing in the House). Another
bill was introduced in the House in 2012 but died in committee. See also H.R. 6339
(112th): Electronic Communications Privacy Act Modernization Act of 2012,
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr6339 (last visited Mar.
15, 2014). There is also a bill to amend the ECPA currently before the Senate,
however it has been stalled since April 25, 2013. See S. 607: Electronic
Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2013, GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s607 (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
16. See generally City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010) (deciding the
case purely on a reasonableness inquiry instead of the Fourth Amendment question).
The Supreme Court declined to review a decision about protections for stored email
messages in 2013. See Jennings v. Broome, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013) (denying
certiorari).
17. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010) (reversing on
procedural grounds a prior decision that held emails were protected under the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
monitoring of non-content information stored with electronic communication service
provider did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
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The second option, on the other hand, would offer Americans
protections by their states,18 and may also pressure Congress to take
action on the federal level. States can take action by enacting more
protective legislation, whether that be in the form of an amendment
of an already existing surveillance statute or whether that involves
passing a new piece of legislation providing for the protection of
electronic communications. In fact, the Texas state legislature
recently took action to protect its citizens and amended its
surveillance statute to implement a warrant requirement for all stored
electronic communications.19
This Note argues that New York should follow Texas’s lead and
update its eavesdropping statute. In fact, a recent discrepancy
between the plain language of New York’s surveillance statute20 and
the state courts’ interpretation of the statute21 presents the legislature
with the perfect opportunity to reconsider the statute’s treatment of
stored electronic communications as discussed in Part II.
Specifically, this Note recommends that New York’s eavesdropping
law be revised to require that state law enforcement officials procure
a search warrant before they search an individual’s stored electronic
communications such as emails and texts. This Note demonstrates
that this solution is the best way to strike the correct balance between
individual privacy rights and law enforcement efficacy.
Part I of this Note provides background information on the law of
eavesdropping generally. It also discusses New York’s eavesdropping
law and the current federal legal framework. Part II examines the
conflict in New York between the plain language of New York’s
eavesdropping statute and the courts’ interpretation of New York’s
eavesdropping statute. Part III advocates for the elimination of
stored electronic communications from the eavesdropping statute. It
further proposes that law enforcement access to these
communications should require a search warrant under New York
law. Finally, Part IV suggests specific revisions to New York’s law to
effect this Note’s suggestions.

18. State statutes will not protect their citizens from electronic surveillance from
federal law enforcement officials.
19. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.02 (West 2013); Bob Sullivan, Don’t
Mess With Texas Email: State Law Ends Some Warrantless Email Searches, NBC
NEWS (June 18, 2013), http://redtape.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/18/19025074-dontmess-with-texas-email-state-law-ends-some-warrantless-email-searches?lite.
20. N.Y. PENAL LAW §250.00(6) (McKinney 2013) (defining “intercepting or
accessing of an electronic communication”).
21. See Gurevich v. Gurevich, 886 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 2009); Moore v. Moore,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 2008, at 26; Boudakian v. Boudakian, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 26, 2008.
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I. BACKGROUND
This Part provides background information on eavesdropping laws
generally. Part I.A explains what the term “eavesdropping” means,
why it is generally prohibited and why we allow government officials
to eavesdrop under limited circumstances. Part I.B explores the
technical process of sending email and text messages in order to
provide background information necessary to understanding the
distinctions made in the federal framework. Part I.C discusses the
federal framework, emphasizing the various distinctions that the law
makes with respect to electronic communications. This discussion is
important to understand the New York courts’ interpretation of the
statute and the nature of the debate over the treatment of electronic
communications.
Finally, Part I.D lays out New York’s
eavesdropping law.
It describes the process of procuring an
eavesdropping warrant in New York, including a discussion of the
showings required by law enforcement in order to obtain the contents
of communications.
A. What Is Eavesdropping?
Blackstone defines eavesdroppers those who “listen under walls or
windows, or the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse.”22
While eavesdropping methods are much more sophisticated today
than in Blackstone’s time, the basic concept is the same:
eavesdropping is the act of listening in on a person’s personal
communications, often unbeknownst to the speaker. And while
private individuals are certainly capable of eavesdropping, the
government is often the biggest perpetrator of all, as recent events
have demonstrated.23
Both state24 and federal laws25 generally prohibit eavesdropping.
Nevertheless, the government is allowed to eavesdrop under specific
circumstances if it meets certain legal thresholds under the applicable
law. Specifically, the federal framework26 contains three different
levels of protection, each requiring the government to meet a distinct
legal threshold. The highest standard is an eavesdropping warrant.
22. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 169 (1769).
23. See Mazzetti & Schmidt, supra note 1; Savage et al., supra note 1.
24. For example, this Note deals with the New York eavesdropping framework
contained in N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.00 (McKinney 2013) and N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§§ 700.05–.70 (McKinney 2013).
25. The controlling federal law is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510–22, 2701–12, 3121–27 (2012).
26. See id.
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Communications requiring an eavesdropping warrant are considered
to have the greatest privacy interests at stake and are therefore
awarded the most protection.27 The next standard requires law
enforcement to obtain a search warrant before they are given access
to certain communications.28 Finally, the lowest standard requires law
enforcement officials to merely obtain an administrative subpoena or
court order. If law enforcement officials meet the requisite legal
standard, they are permitted to intercept or access these
communications. These standards are mirrored in New York’s
surveillance law, as discussed in greater depth below.29
The varying standards represent the balance struck between law
enforcement’s interests and individuals’ privacy interests.30 Advances
in communications technology often and easily disrupt this delicate
balance. If eavesdropping laws fail to keep up with these advances,
and the delicate balance is upset, there is potential for serious
consequences, both for individual civil liberties and law enforcement.
The growing prevalence of electronic communications like email and
text messaging is one such advance in technology whose outdated
treatment under the law of eavesdropping has upset this fragile
balance.31

27. See Orin Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big
Brother that Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 621 (2003). These thresholds range from
least protective (no legal process or subpoena) to a high level of protection
(eavesdropping warrant). See id.
28. See Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012).
29. See infra Part I.C.
30. In fact, Congress recognized the need for this balance when they enacted the
ECPA stating that the goal of the ECPA was twofold: to preserve “a fair balance
between the privacy expectations of citizens and the legitimate needs of law
enforcement.” H.R. REP. NO. 99–647, at 19 (1986).
31. See generally Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment
Protection for Stored E-Mail, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121; Orin S. Kerr, Applying the
Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005
(2010); Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic

Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557 (2004); Katharine M. O’Connor, :0 OMG They
Searched My Txts: Unraveling the Search and Seizure of Text Messages, 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 685; Alexander Scolnik, Protections for Electronic Communications: The
Stored Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 349
(2009); Ric Simmons, Can Winston Save Us From Big Brother? The Need for
Judicial Consistency in Regulating Hyper-Intrusive Searches, 55 RUTGERS L. REV.
547 (2003).
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What Are “Stored Electronic Communications”?

This Note is primarily concerned with two types of electronic
communications—email messages and text messages—and their
treatment under New York’s eavesdropping law.32 To understand the
distinctions the New York courts (and the ECPA) have made with
respect to these communications, it is important to understand the
mechanics of their transmission.
The nature of email has changed significantly over the last few
decades. When Congress first passed the ECPA in 1986, web-based
email systems like Gmail and Yahoo!Mail did not yet exist.33 Instead,
email primarily existed in local intranets where users would download
their messages from a server to their own computer.34 Copies of email
messages already received and read would then remain on the
individual’s computer rather than on a remote server.35
Today, many email services are web-based.36 Emails are sent using
a collection of computer servers operated by ISPs that work together
and function as a single system.37 Each ISP has the task of running
applications and storing data in small pieces before it passes that data
on to the next server in line.38 After a user composes and sends an
email, the message is broken up into small packets and distributed,
stored, and transported among different servers until they are
reconfigured with the recipient. Once the messages are received, they
are stored in remote storage on the service provider’s server.39 So
instead of subscribing to a network like America Online and
downloading emails from that network’s server onto a personal
computer, today’s web-based email systems store received emails on a
remote ISP server.40
Text messages go through a similar process. Cellular phones that
are enabled for text messaging contain Short Message Service (SMS)

32. For a more in-depth discussion of email technology and its interplay with the
SCA, see Courtney Bowman, A Way Forward After Warshak: Fourth Amendment
Protections for E-Mail, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 809, 815–16 (2012).
33. See Robison, supra note 8, at 1197–98.
34. See id. at 1198.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 1199 (defining “cloud computing” as “the ability to run applications
and store data on a service provider’s computers over the Internet, rather than on a
person’s desktop computer”); see also Bowman, supra note 32, at 815–16.
37. See Robison, supra note 8, at 1200.
38. See id. See also Bowman, supra note 32, at 815–16.
39. See Robison, supra note 8, at 1200; Bowman, supra note 32, at 815–16.
40. This evolution to web-based e-mail, in which e-mails are stored with an ISP, is
significant to the discussion of the third party doctrine infra Part III.
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technology.41 After a sender enters a message into his phone and
sends it, the message is transmitted to a Short Message Center
(SMC), where it is temporarily stored.42 The SMC then sends the
message to the recipient’s mobile device.43 If the receiving phone is
unavailable, the SMC queues the message and attempts to send it
again.44 A sent message can be stored in both the sender’s phone and
the recipient’s phone.45 The message will remain on these devices
until a user manually deletes it or it deletes automatically to make
room for new messages.46 The service provider also stores copies of
the messages on its server.47
Thus, email and text messages go through varying stages of
transition, reception and storage.
Under the current federal
framework, as discussed in Part I.C., the standard that law
enforcement officials have to meet differs depending on what stage
the messages are in.
C.

The Federal Framework

New York courts have interpreted the State’s eavesdropping
statute to reflect the federal framework’s distinction between
electronic communications that are in-transit and electronic
communications that are in storage. This Subpart will explore the
federal framework, as an understanding of this distinction is necessary
to understand the New York courts’ position.
On the federal level, the ECPA48 governs federal law
enforcement’s access to a person’s personal electronic
communications.49 Congress enacted the ECPA in 1986 to expand
and revise Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act (Title III).50 Specifically, the ECPA extended some of the
41. See O’Connor, supra note 31, at 688. This Note does not discuss law
enforcement access to texts via cell phones. Instead, this Note is concerned with the
procurement of copies of texts from service providers.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22, 2701–12,
3121–27 (2012).
49. The ECPA should not be confused with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA), which establishes a separate legal regime for “foreign intelligence”
surveillance. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–85 (Supp. 2011). The ECPA outlines guidelines
regulating ordinary law enforcement surveillance within the United States.
50. See Scolnik, supra note 31, at 375.

1418

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLI

protections of Title III to electronic communications.51 The ECPA
created several distinctions for electronic communications based on
the kind of information sought and the stage of transmission, as
discussed below.
The ECPA is composed of three parts: (1) the Wiretap Act;52 (2)
the Stored Communications Act (SCA);53 and (3) the Pen Register
Act.54 Generally, the Wiretap Act governs the interception of “wire,”
“oral,” and “electronic” communications that are in-transit.55 The
SCA governs access to communications that have been received and
stored, like stored voicemail messages, emails and text messages.56
Finally, the Pen Register Act regulates the use of pen registers trap
and trace devices. Trap and trace devices and pen registers identify
the phone number of an incoming call or the outgoing phone numbers
of calls placed from a particular phone, respectively. 57

1.

The Wiretap Act

The Wiretap Act governs law enforcement access to
communications while those communications are still in transmission.
Specifically, the Wiretap Act prohibits any person from intentionally
intercepting any wire, oral or electronic communication.58 Therefore,
an interception is only a violation of the Wiretap Act if the
communication fits into one of three categories.
A “wire
communication” is a conversation that takes place via telephone.59
An “oral communication” is a face-to-face conversation in which the
speakers have a reasonable expectation of privacy.60 “Electronic
communications” encompass communication via computer, including
data transmission.61 In effect, any conversation, either over the phone

51. See Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the
Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 41–42 (2004).
52. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2012).
53. Id. §§ 2701–12.
54. Id. §§ 3121–27. This Note is primarily concerned with the Wiretap Act and
the Stored Communications Act, as these two statutes govern law enforcement access
to electronic communications like e-mails and text-messages.
55. §§ 2510–22.
56. §§ 2701–12.
57. See GINA STEVENS & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-327,
PRIVACY: AN ABBREVIATED OUTLINE OF FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING
WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING 46 (2012). This Note focuses on
electronic communications and therefore, the Pen Register Act will not be analyzed.
58. § 2511(1).
59. See STEVENS & DOYLE, supra note 57, at 12.
60. See id.
61. See id.
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or in person, or any electronic communication that has not yet been
received by the recipient, falls within the Wiretap Act. The
prohibited interception is limited to the contents of these
communications as opposed to non-content information like the
caller or receiver’s phone numbers.62
Government officials are exempt from the prohibitions against
interception contained in the Wiretap Act when they procure an
eavesdropping warrant,63 or when they get the consent of one of the
parties to the communication.64 Obtaining an eavesdropping warrant
requires law enforcement officials to meet the highest legal standard
under the ECPA.65 Thus, the Wiretap Act protects these in-transit
communications above all others. The Wiretap Act also requires that
state wiretapping laws be at least as protective as the federal law or
risk invalidation under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.66
Therefore, New York, in considering a revision to its eavesdropping
laws, must continue to require state law enforcement officials to
obtain an eavesdropping warrant for the interception of wire, oral or
electronic communications that are in-transit,67 as discussed in Part
IV.

62. The Wiretap Act defines “contents” as “any information concerning the
substance, purport or meaning of that communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2012).
The SCA allows the government to obtain non-content basic subscriber information
with a subpoena. Basic subscriber information includes the subscriber’s name,
address, and telephone number. See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored
Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1208, 1219–20 (2004).
63. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516–18 (2012); STEVENS & DOYLE, supra note 57, at 23. To
obtain an eavesdropping warrant, the attorney general, or someone authorized to act
in his absence must file an application to an authorized judge. The application must
include the identity of the officer, a full and complete statement of facts, a statement
detailing other investigative procedures that have been tried and failed, a statement
detailing the period of time required for the interception and a statement detailing
previous applications for interception involving the same persons. See § 2518(1).
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2012).
65. See § 2518(3); see also infra Part I.D.1.
66. See U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2; 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2). In other words, state statutes
must require an eavesdropping warrant for those electronic communications that are
in-transit because the Wiretap Act requires it.
67. See supra Part III.B.3. However, the Wiretap Act does not require an
eavesdropping warrant for stored electronic communications. See Stored
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012). Therefore, if New York’s
eavesdropping statute was revised to exclude stored electronic communications, that
revision would satisfy the minimum federal constitutional criteria established by the
Wiretap Act. See § 2516(2).
However, any revision to exclude electronic
communications altogether from the reach of the eavesdropping statute, thus
eliminating the in-transit-versus-stored distinction, would violate the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
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If a communication is not in-transit but instead has already been
received and/or stored by the recipient, its treatment will be
determined under the Stored Communications Act (SCA).

2.

The Stored Communications Act

The SCA governs law enforcement access to electronic
communications that are stored with a service provider.68 The SCA
prohibits law enforcement from intentionally accessing a service
provider’s facility without authorization in order to access a wire or
electronic communication while it is in electronic storage.69 Under
the SCA, “service providers” would include SMCs and ISPs, as
discussed above.70 The SCA prohibits accessing the contents of stored
text messages and emails in the records of these providers.
Just like the Wiretap Act, the SCA provides an exemption for law
enforcement.71
Law enforcement officials may compel service
providers to produce copies of electronic communications that are
stored on their server if they meet certain requirements under the
SCA. As shown in the following paragraphs, the SCA is generally
much less protective of these communications than the Wiretap Act.
The SCA creates several distinctions that determine what showing
law enforcement officials must make to obtain access to stored
communications.72 First, the SCA distinguishes between two types of
providers: what the SCA calls “Electronic Communication Service”
(ECS) providers and “Remote Computing Service” (RCS)
providers.73 An ECS can hold content in “electronic storage” which is
defined as “any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or
electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission.”74

68. See STEVENS & DOYLE, supra note 57, at 35. The SCA defines “electronic
storage” as “any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and any storage of
such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup
protection of such communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2012). Courts have
concluded that law enforcement access to stored text messages is governed by the
SCA. See United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 76 (D.D.C. 2006), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
69. See § 2701(a).
70. See supra Part I.B.
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
72. This Note focuses on the distinctions made with respect to ECS and RCS
providers, and those messages that have been stored for more than 180 days and
those that have been stored for less than 180 days. For a more thorough exploration
of the SCA, see Kerr, supra note 62.
73. See § 2703.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A) (2012).
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For example, a message that sits in an email inbox after transmission
but before the user retrieves or reads the message is an example of
ECS “electronic storage.”75 Additionally, any time that a message is
stored intermediately on its way to the recipient, that provider is
considered an ECS provider under the SCA.76
Regarding RCS providers, the SCA defines RCS as “the provision
to the public of computer storage or processing services by means of
an electronic communication system.”77 Files held in long-term
storage after reception are protected under the rules for RCS
providers.78 Sometimes a provider can be considered a provider of
both an RCS and an ECS, depending on the status of the particular
communication that is the subject of the search.79 In this way, the
inquiry focuses on the provider’s role with respect to a particular
communication.80 One specific provider, therefore, may be a provider
of ECS with respect to a certain communication or a provider of RCS
with respect to another communication.81
If a provider is an ECS provider then the SCA creates a second
distinction between those messages stored with an ECS provider for
more than 180 days and those stored with an ECS provider for less
than 180 days.82 If the communication is held in storage with an ECS
provider for less than 180 days, the government needs a search
warrant in order to compel the provider to disclose it.83 If the
communication is in ECS storage for more than 180 days, the
government may compel the provider to disclose it with a subpoena
or court order.84 If a communication is stored with an RCS, the
government will also only need a subpoena or court order to compel
the provider to disclose it, regardless of how long it has been in
storage.85

75. See Fred Kemper, Compulsion of Text Messages After Quon: Applying Old
Law to New Technology, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1381, 1386 (2012).
76. See Kerr, supra note 62, at 1216.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2012).
78. See Kerr, supra note 62, at 1216.
79. See id. at 1215–16.
80. See id. at 1215.
81. See id. at 1215–16.
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012).
83. Id.
84. § 2703(a)–(b), (d).
85. § 2703(b). Government officials can use a court order or subpoena only if
they also give the user prior notice. See id. To obtain a § 2703 court order, the
government must provide “specific and articulable facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe” that the information to be compelled is “relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” § 2703(d).
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To see how these distinctions play out in practice, it may be helpful
to return to the Joe Smith example.
Under the SCA, law
enforcement officials could access any of Joe’s unopened emails or
text messages that are on his ISP or SMC’s servers for less than 180
days only with a search warrant.86 However, if Joe’s messages are
unopened and stored on a server for more than 180 days, or opened
at all (regardless of time stored) law enforcement agents can compel
disclosure from Joe’s service providers with a court order or a
subpoena.87
Therefore, the Wiretap Act and the SCA create different regimes
depending on whether the electronic communication sought is intransit or is in storage. The Wiretap Act offers greater protection for
electronic communications that are in-transit, while the SCA’s
distinctions based on the type of provider being used and the status of
the message (opened, un-opened etc.) allow law enforcement officials
to access stored electronic communications more easily.
D. New York’s Framework
This Subpart lays out New York’s current eavesdropping
framework. Specifically, it discusses the procedures required under
New York law in order to obtain both an eavesdropping warrant and
a search warrant.
New York’s eavesdropping statute, like many states’ statutes, is
heavily influenced by the ECPA. As a result, many of the
requirements in New York mirror the requirements at the federal
level. Unlike the ECPA, however, New York’s framework does not
consist of three separate statutes that mirror the Wiretap Act, the
SCA and the Pen Register Act respectively. Instead New York has
two statutes that address eavesdropping. One statute, in New York’s
penal law, criminalizes the act of eavesdropping by private
individuals.88 The second statute, in New York’s criminal procedure
law, governs eavesdropping by state law enforcement officers.89 The
latter statute, section 700 of New York’s Criminal Procedure Law
(section 700) will be the primary focus of this Note.

86. See Kerr, supra note 62, at 1223 tbl.
87. Email that is in electronic storage for more than 180 days can be accessed by
either: (1) a subpoena with notice to the user, (2) a court order with notice to the
user, or (3) a search warrant. See § 2703; see also Kerr, supra note 62, table on 1223.
88. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 250.00–.65 (McKinney 2013).
89. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 700.05–.70 (McKinney 2013).
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Like the federal Wiretap Act, the statute requires officials to
obtain an eavesdropping warrant90 or procure the consent of one of
the parties to the communication91 to access communications covered
by the statute. However, New York does not contain a state statute
that is the equivalent of the SCA. Therefore, treatment of stored
electronic communications in New York is often determined
according to the SCA.92

1.

Obtaining an Eavesdropping Warrant in New York

New York’s eavesdropping statute provides that law enforcement
officials may intercept “a telephonic or telegraphic communication,”93
“a conversation or discussion,”94 or “electronic communications”95 if
the officials first obtain an eavesdropping warrant.
To obtain an eavesdropping warrant under New York’s
eavesdropping statute, the New York District Attorney, Attorney
General, Deputy Attorney General, or anyone authorized to act on
their behalf96 must first file an ex parte application with the court.97
The application must contain the following: (1) a statement of the
applicant’s identity and authority to make the application;98 (2) a
statement of the facts that justify the use of the warrant;99 (3) a
statement that the communications are not privileged; (4) a statement
90. See id. § 700.15.
91. See id. § 700.05(3).
92. See e.g., People v. Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d 868, 875–76 (Sup. Ct. 2013); People
v. Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590, 594–96 (Crim. Ct. 2012).
93. See CRIM. PROC. § 700.05(3). This term is the equivalent of the term
contained in the federal framework before being amended by the USA Patriot Act.
The Patriot Act changed the term to “wire communication” to exclude voicemail
messages from the Wiretap Act’s framework.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See CRIM. PROC. § 700.05(5). This limitation is required under federal law.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (2012).
97. The term “justice” is defined by section 700 as any justice of an appellate
division, supreme court, or county court of the judicial department or county in which
the eavesdropping warrant is to be executed. See CRIM. PROC. § 700.05(4).
98. Id. § 700.20(2)(a).
99. CRIM. PROC. § 700.20(2)(b) (“including (i) a statement of facts establishing
probable cause to believe that a particular designated offense has been, is being, or is
about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and location of the
facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted or the
video surveillance is to be conducted, (iii) a particular description of the type of the
communications sought to be intercepted or of the observations sought to be made,
and (iv) the identity of the person, if known, committing such designated offense and
whose communications are to be intercepted or who is to be the subject of the video
surveillance.”)
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that normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed
or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried; (5) a statement
of the period of time for which surveillance is sought; and (6) a
statement of any previous applications for surveillance of the same
persons or places as are the subject of the current application.100
These requirements are substantively identical to the showing
required under federal law.101
After an application102 is made to an authorized court,103 the judge
has discretion to decide whether to grant or deny the application.104
The judge will evaluate the application to determine if: (1) there is
probable cause to believe that a particular person is committing, has
committed, or is about to commit a designated offense;105 (2) there is
probable cause to believe that particular communications concerning
that offense will be obtained through eavesdropping;106 (3) there is
probable cause to believe that the place where the communications
are to be intercepted is being used, or is about to be used, in
connection with the commission of a designated offense.107
If the eavesdropping warrant issued is initially authorized to
intercept communications as long as is necessary to achieve the
objective of the authorization, it may not last longer than thirty
days.108 The thirty-day period begins no later than ten days after the
warrant issues.109 The warrant also contains a provision that requires

100. CRIM. PROC. § 700.20(2)(c)–(f).
101. The ECPA requires law enforcement to make the same showing. See United
States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 453–55 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (setting out the
requirements for obtaining an eavesdropping warrant under federal law); People v.
Rabb, 945 N.E.2d 447, 450 (N.Y. 2011) (“[I]t was the Legislature’s intention to
conform state standards for court-authorized eavesdropping warrants with federal
standards.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Compare CRIM. PROC. § 700.20, with
18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2012).
102. In an emergency situation where imminent danger of death or serious injury
exists, the statute does not require a written application but allows for an oral or
electronic communication with an authorized justice. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
700.21(1) (McKinney 2013).
103. See supra note 97, discussing authorized courts.
104. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.25 (McKinney 2013). In determining
whether or not an application should have been granted, appellate courts typically
defer to the discretion of the issuing justice. See e.g., People v. Baker, 577 N.E.2d
1064 (N.Y. 1991) (denying appeal of judgment based on sufficiency of eavesdropping
warrant); People v. Ianniello, 554 N.E.2d 75 (N.Y. 1990).
105. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.15(2) (MCKINNEY 2013).
106. CRIM. PROC. § 700.15(3).
107. CRIM. PROC. § 700.15(5).
108. See CRIM. PROC. § 700.10(2). However, an applicant may file a request for an
extension for an additional thirty days of surveillance. See id. § 700.40.
109. See CRIM. PROC. § 700.10(2).
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surveillance be conducted in such a way as to minimize the
interception of communications outside the scope of the
surveillance.110

2.

Obtaining a Search Warrant Under New York Law

Unlike the ECPA, New York’s eavesdropping law does not contain
a separate framework for stored communications. Instead, issuance
of a search warrant is governed by section 690 of New York’s criminal
procedure law.111
The requirements for a search warrant differ from the higher
requirements of an eavesdropping warrant in a few ways. A search
warrant simply requires probable cause, meaning that the government
must present facts establishing a likelihood that a crime has occurred
and that evidence of the crime exists in the location to be searched.112
Compared to an eavesdropping warrant, a search warrant does not
require a showing that: (1) the heightened particularity requirement is
satisfied; (2) “normal investigative procedures” have been tried and
failed; (3) the surveillance will be conducted in a way that minimizes
the interception of irrelevant information; (4) there is probable cause
to believe the interception will reveal evidence of one of a limited
number of specific crimes.113
II. THE CONFLICT
This Part explores the current conflict in New York between the
explicit language of the eavesdropping statute and the recent
interpretation of the statute by the courts. Part II.A sets out the
statutory language indicating that law enforcement in New York
would need to obtain an eavesdropping warrant to compel disclosure
of all electronic communications, regardless of whether or not they
are in-transit or stored. Part II.B examines recent decisions by the
New York courts interpreting the definition of “intercepting” to mean
accessing electronic communications that are in-transit, not those
communications that have been received and stored. Part II
demonstrates that this conflict offers the New York legislature the
chance to revise its statute to clarify the treatment of electronic
communications under the state’s eavesdropping law.

110. See id. § 700.30(9).
111. See id. §§ 690.05–.55.
112. See Kerr, supra note 27, at 620 tbl.; see also CRIM. PROC. § 690.35(3)(b);
People v. Vanness, 965 N.Y.S.2d 227, 230 (App. Div. 2013).
113. See Simmons, supra note 31, at 553–54.
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A. The Statute’s Plain Language
New York’s eavesdropping statute114 states that if law enforcement
agents wish to intercept a person’s private communications they must
first obtain an eavesdropping warrant according to the procedure laid
out in the statute.115 Specifically the statute defines “eavesdropping”
to include “‘wiretapping’, ‘mechanical overhearing of conversation,’
or the ‘intercepting or accessing of an electronic communication’, as
those terms are defined in section 250.00 of the penal law.”116 Section
250.00 of the penal law defines each of those terms as follows:
“Wiretapping” means the intentional overhearing or recording of
a telephonic or telegraphic communication by a person other than a
sender or receiver thereof, without the consent of either the sender
or receiver, by means of any instrument, device or equipment.117
“Mechanical overhearing of a conversation” means the
intentional overhearing or recording of a conversation or discussion,
without the consent of at least one party thereto, by a person not
present thereat, by means of any instrument, device or equipment.118
“Intercepting or accessing of an electronic communication” and
“intentionally intercepted or accessed” mean the intentional
acquiring, receiving, collecting, overhearing, or recording of an
electronic communication, without the consent of the sender or
intended receiver thereof, by means of any instrument, device or
equipment . . . .119

Therefore, the statute prohibits three types of “eavesdropping”: (1)
wiretapping a telephone or telegraphic communication; (2) bugging
or recording an in-person conversation; and (3) intercepting or
accessing electronic communications. The language in (3) prohibiting
eavesdropping
by
intercepting
or
accessing
electronic

114. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.05(3) (McKinney 2013) (defining
“intercepted communication” as including, “(a) a telephonic or telegraphic
communication which was intentionally overheard or recorded by a person other
than the sender or receiver thereof, without the consent of the sender or receiver, by
means of any instrument, device or equipment, or (b) a conversation or discussion
which was intentionally overheard or recorded, without the consent of at least one
party thereto, by a person not present thereat, by means of any instrument, device or
equipment; or (c) an electronic communication which was intentionally intercepted
or accessed, as that term is defined in section 250.00 of the penal law”).
115. See supra Part I.D.
116. CRIM. PROC. § 700.05(1).
117. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.00(1) (McKinney 2013).
118. PENAL § 250.00(2)
119. PENAL § 250.00(6).
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communications is the key language that the courts have taken issue
with, as discussed in Part II.B below.
The statute prohibits “intercepting or accessing” an electronic
communication. The definition contains words like “acquiring,
receiving, collecting” suggesting that it is not simply the
contemporaneous interception of electronic communications while
they travel from sender to recipient that is prohibited but also the
accessing of such communications after they have been received.
Therefore, the language of the New York eavesdropping framework
fails to make the distinction between electronic communications that
are stored and those that are in-transit.120 Instead, the language
indicates that law enforcement access to any type of electronic
communication requires an eavesdropping warrant. However, courts
interpreting the statute have determined that the statute does in fact
only apply to those communications that are in-transit, despite the
statute’s plain language.121
B.

The Courts’ Interpretation

Few cases have interpreted the language of New York’s
eavesdropping law. In fact, the case law is silent as to whether or not
law enforcement officials must procure an eavesdropping warrant to
gain access to stored electronic communications.122 However, New

120. Significantly, the ECPA simply uses the term “intercept” rather than New
York’s “intercepting or accessing electronic communications.” This departure from
the federal language suggests that the New York legislature, in drafting the statute in
the shadow of the ECPA, made a conscious decision to depart from the federal
framework.
121. See Gurevich v. Gurevich, 886 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 2009); Boudakian v.
Boudakian, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 26, 2008 (Sup. Ct. 2008); Moore v. Moore, N.Y. L.J., Aug.
14, 2008 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
122. New York courts have heard similar inquiries. For example, in People v.
Harris, the question was whether or not the government can compel Twitter to turn
over the records of a user’s tweets. 949 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Crim. Ct. 2012). In that case,
the defendant was charged with disorderly conduct after marching on the Brooklyn
Bridge. See id. at 592. The prosecution sent a subpoena to Twitter seeking the
defendant’s account information and relevant tweets. See id. The defendant moved
to quash the subpoena but the court ruled against him, issuing a court order on
Twitter for the information’s disclosure. Twitter then moved to quash the court
order. See id. The court held that the Fourth Amendment did not protect the
defendant’s tweets because the defendant intentionally broadcasted them to the
public. See id. at 595. The court was careful to distinguish this case from a case
concerning email or text messaging stating that this case “deals with tweets that were
publicly posted rather than an e-mail or text that would be directed to a single person
or a select few.” Id. at 590. Similarly, New York courts have also considered the
question of whether government access to cell site location data without a search
warrant is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See People v. Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d
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York’s lower courts have recently been faced with interpreting the
statute in the context of matrimonial actions.123 In each of these cases,
a spouse accessed his or her estranged spouse’s stored emails and
subsequently sought to have them admitted into evidence. The key
inquiry in these cases is whether the spouse’s actions constituted a
violation of New York’s eavesdropping statute. If the spouse’s
actions are a violation of the statute, then the emails are inadmissible
evidence.
For example, in Moore v. Moore,124 a wife discovered a laptop in
the trunk of her estranged husband’s car from which she downloaded
Internet messages that she wished to use as evidence in their divorce
proceeding.125 The husband filed a motion to suppress and argued the
disk was obtained through violation of New York’s eavesdropping
statute and was therefore inadmissible.126 The court rejected this
argument and found that accessing files downloaded and saved to a
computer did not constitute “intercepting or accessing” a
communication in violation of Penal Law § 250.05.127
Similarly, in another divorce proceeding, Boudakian v.
Boudakian,128 which was decided a few months after Moore, a wife
downloaded communications from her estranged husband’s computer
at their home.129 The court, following Moore, also held that the wife
did not violate New York’s eavesdropping statute because the
communications were not in-transit when she accessed them.130
The most recent and in-depth discussion of New York’s
eavesdropping statute was in Gurevich v. Gurevich.131 Gurevich was a
matrimonial action where the wife gained access to her estranged
husband’s email account and purported to use those emails to
demonstrate that her husband was shielding income from her.132 The

868 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (holding that “pinging” the defendant’s cell phone did not violate
his Fourth Amendment rights).
123. See Gurevich, 886 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 2009); Boudakian, N.Y. L.J., Dec.
26, 2008 (Sup. Ct. 2008); Moore, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 2008 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
124. N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 2008 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. N.Y. L.J., Dec. 26, 2008 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Gurevich v. Gurevich, 886 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 2009).
132. Id.
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question was whether the emails were inadmissible under N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 4506,133 which provides:
The contents of any overheard or recorded communication,
conversation or discussion, or evidence derived therefrom, which
has been obtained by conduct constituting the crime of
eavesdropping, as defined by section 250.05 of the penal law may
not be received in evidence in any trial, hearing or proceeding
before any court . . . .134

In other words, the court had to determine whether the wife
violated the eavesdropping statute when she accessed her estranged
husband’s stored emails.135 First, the court had to analyze the
definitions set out in the eavesdropping law, including the definition
for “intercept or access.”136
The court concluded based on the statute’s legislative history137 that
the purpose of the statute was to prohibit individuals from
intercepting communications that were in-transit.138 Therefore, the
wife did not “intercept” her husband’s emails within the meaning of
the eavesdropping statute, and N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4506 did not prevent
the emails’ admission into evidence.139 That is, the court concluded
that despite the plain language of the statute, New York’s
eavesdropping law mirrors federal law in that it applies only to those
electronic communications that are in-transit and does not apply to
those communications that are stored.140
As these cases demonstrate, there is a conflict between the plain
language of the eavesdropping statute and the courts’ recent
interpretation. The plain language indicates that all electronic
communications are covered by New York’s eavesdropping law,
meaning law enforcement officials must obtain an eavesdropping
warrant in order to intercept messages that are both in-transit and
stored. Nevertheless, New York courts have interpreted the statute
to mirror the federal framework despite its language, meaning that
communications that are in-transit require an eavesdropping warrant
while those messages that have been received and/or are being stored
do not. This conflict begs the critical question, which interpretation is

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 4506(1) (McKinney 2013).
See Gurevich, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
See id.
See 1988 N.Y. Sess. Laws 744 (McKinney).
See Gurevich, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 560–61.
See id. at 561–62.
Compare Gurevich, 886 N.Y.S.2d 558, with 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012).
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correct? This Note argues that the New York legislature should
revise New York’s eavesdropping law to clarify the courts’
interpretation.
III. NEW Y ORK LAW SHOULD REQUIRE AN EAVESDROPPING
WARRANT FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT’S ACCESS TO ALL STORED
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
The conflict in New York between the plain language of the
eavesdropping statute and New York courts’ interpretation of the
statute creates the opportunity to revise and clarify that statute. This
Part proposes a revision to New York’s eavesdropping statute to
exclude stored electronic communications. It also proposes that New
York enact a new law requiring law enforcement officials to procure a
search warrant to gain access to stored electronic communications.141
Part III.A argues that stored electronic communications should not
be protected under New York’s eavesdropping statute.
This
argument is rather simple and straightforward: there must be a
balance between the risk to individual privacy rights and the interests
of law enforcement counsel against requiring an eavesdropping
warrant for stored electronic communications.
Part III.B, however, makes the more contentious argument that
stored electronic communications should require law enforcement
officials to obtain a search warrant. While the courts have largely
shied away from the question—whether the Fourth Amendment
protects stored electronic communications—an examination under
the reasonable expectation test as set out in Katz dictates that a
warrant should be required to access these communications. This
result, balanced against the interests of law enforcement, supports the
conclusion that stored electronic communications should be protected
by a warrant requirement in New York.
A. Law Enforcement Access to Stored Communications in New
York Should Not Require an Eavesdropping Warrant
The weighing of individual privacy rights against law enforcement
efficacy counsels against giving stored electronic communications
heightened protection under New York’s law. The degree of
government intrusion upon individuals’ privacy does not warrant the

141. It is important to note that New York’s eavesdropping statute can be revised
to exclude stored communications, but must preserve the treatment of in-transit
electronic communications due to the requirements under federal law. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2516(2) (2012).
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heightened protection of an eavesdropping warrant. Moreover,
requiring law enforcement officials to meet the heightened
requirements for an eavesdropping warrant, given this lower risk, will
impair their ability to investigate and prosecute crime.

1.

The Threat Posed to Individual Privacy Rights Is Not as Great
for Stored Electronic Communications as it Is for in-Transit
Electronic Communications

The differing level of government intrusion between electronic
communications that are in-transit and those that are stored supports
treating the two types of communications differently.142 Intercepting
electronic communications that are in-transit poses a much greater
threat to personal privacy rights than interception of stored electronic
communications. Thus, in-transit electronic communications should
be given greater protection.
For example, if the government wishes to obtain copies of a stored
electronic communication it must first procure the required warrant
or court order according to the SCA and serve it on the service
provider.143 Then the provider must turn over the requested
communications.144
Therefore, accessing stored electronic
communications is a one-time event. By contrast, if the government
instead seeks to intercept electronic communications en route from
sender to receiver, they will have to install what is called a “sniffer
device”145 which will monitor all communications traveling to and
from a given account for a specified period of time. In this way,
intercepting in-transit electronic communications is an ongoing
process more akin to wiretapping a phone line or bugging a residence.
Accessing stored electronic communications via a compulsory
order to service providers represents a lower intrusion upon
individual privacy rights and thus should not require the same
heightened level of protection as those communications that are intransit. Wiretapping and other similar methods of intercepting
communications while they are en route require law enforcement to
make a higher showing upon the understanding that this continuous
intrusion poses a great threat to personal privacy rights.146 The law
allows the government to engage in these practices only when they

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See Kerr, supra note 62, at 1231.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.C.
Kerr, supra note 62, at 1231.
See generally Freiwald, supra note 51.
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can satisfy the rigorous requirements for an eavesdropping warrant.
By contrast, compelling service providers to turn over copies of stored
electronic communications does not pose a continuous, extended
threat to personal privacy.147 Instead, law enforcement must make a
one-time application for an order and serve it on a service provider.148
The lack of continuous intrusion inherent in law enforcement
access to stored electronic communications counsels against requiring
law enforcement to obtain an eavesdropping warrant under New
York’s rigorous standards. Additionally, this solution is supported by
the disproportionate burden that this standard would place on law
enforcement officials.

2. Requiring an Eavesdropping Warrant for Access to Stored
Electronic Communications Would Overburden Law Enforcement
Officials
Requiring law enforcement officials to obtain an eavesdropping
warrant to compel disclosure of stored electronic communications
would significantly impede New York officials’ criminal
investigations.
The higher showing required to obtain an
eavesdropping warrant could result in delaying access to important
evidence and, in some circumstances, preventing access to these
communications all together.
For example, the category of courts authorized to issue an
eavesdropping warrant is much narrower than those authorized to
issue other court orders. Only appellate division and superior court
judges and justices can issue an eavesdropping warrant, as opposed to
a search warrant, which can be issued by any local criminal court.149
Additionally, the category of officials authorized to apply for an
eavesdropping warrant is also much narrower than those officials that
can apply for a search warrant. Only high-level prosecutorial officials
of the state may apply for an eavesdropping warrant150 while any
public servant acting in the course of his official duties may apply for
When applied to stored electronic
a search warrant.151
communications these procedures could unduly delay government
access to key evidence.

147. See generally id.
148. See generally id.
149. Compare N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.05(4) (McKinney 2013), with N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 120.30(1) (McKinney 2013).
150. CRIM. PROC. § 700.05(5).
151. Id. § 690.05(1).
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Additionally, the substantive requirements of an application for an
eavesdropping warrant are much more strenuous.152 To obtain an
eavesdropping warrant, an appropriate applicant as defined by the
statute must file an application making the following showings: (1) a
statement of the applicant’s identity and authority to make the
application;153 (2) a statement of the facts that justify the use of the
warrant;154 (3) a statement that the communications are not
privileged;155 (4) a statement that normal investigative procedures
have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to
succeed if tried;156 (5) a statement of the period of time for which
surveillance is sought;157 and (6) a statement of any previous
applications for surveillance of the same persons or places as are the
subject of the current application.158
The second requirement for the application, the statement of facts
that justify the use of the warrant, must include:
(i) a statement of facts establishing probable cause to believe that a
particular designated offense has been, is being, or is about to be
committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and location of
the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to
be intercepted or the video surveillance is to be conducted, (iii) a
particular description of the type of the communications sought to
be intercepted or of the observations sought to be made, and (iv) the
identity of the person, if known, committing such designated offense
and whose communications are to be intercepted or who is to be the
subject of the video surveillance.159

Requirements (ii) and (iii) above, implement the Fourth
Importantly, (iii)
Amendment’s “particularity” requirement.160
specifies that the applicant particularly describe the type of
communication sought. This means that law enforcement agents
must include a description of the communication’s subject matter so

152. See supra Part I.D.
153. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.20(2)(a) (McKinney 2013).
154. CRIM. PROC. § 700.20(2)(b).
155. CRIM. PROC. § 700.20(2)(c).
156. CRIM. PROC. § 700.20(2)(d).
157. CRIM. PROC. § 700.20(2)(e).
158. CRIM. PROC. § 700.20(2)(f).
159. CRIM. PROC. § 700.20(2)(b).
160. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55–56 (1967) (“The Fourth Amendment
commands that a warrant issue not only upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, but also ‘particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.’”).
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that they are not given a blank check to intercept all communications
sent to a certain account.
This showing is substantially higher than that required for
obtaining a search warrant in New York. In New York, the statement
of facts justifying the search warrant must simply include a statement
that there is probable cause for the search and that the item sought
will be found in the place described.161
Requiring government officials to make these heightened showings
given the lower intrusion on individual privacy is inappropriate. If
New York requires its law enforcement officials to first obtain an
eavesdropping warrant before they gain access to stored emails, there
will necessarily be cases in which the crime charged is not listed as a
specified crime under New York’s statute.162 Thus, for those cases,
law enforcement officials will not be allowed to access a suspect’s
stored electronic communications, even if they can satisfy all of the
other rigorous requirements.
Additionally, New York’s statute (like the federal framework)
requires an applicant to demonstrate that normal investigative
procedures have been tried and have failed. In New York this
requirement does not mean that the applicant needs to show that
every other investigative technique has been exhausted,163 but it does
require a showing that other techniques have been tried first or that
other techniques would be ineffective. This requirement was
implemented as part of the Wiretap Act out of a concern that such an
intrusive search should be a last resort.164 Access to stored electronic
communications, however, does not represent the same continuous
intrusion that wiretapping, bugging, or installing a sniffer device does.
The law should not require that law enforcement officials exhaust
other avenues first.
Given the substantial burden that an eavesdropping warrant
requirement would place on New York law enforcement and the
lower threat to individual privacy rights under those circumstances,
reinforcing the plain language of the statute and requiring an
eavesdropping warrant for stored electronic communications would

161. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 690.35(3)(b) (McKinney 2013).
162. For example, enterprise corruption is not a designated offense under New
York’s statute and therefore eavesdropping warrants will not be issued for these
investigations. See People v. Wakefield Fin. Corp., 590 N.Y.S.2d 382, 387 (Sup. Ct.
1992).
163. See People v. Haji, 767 N.Y.S.2d 826, 827 (App. Div. 2003).
164. See United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 (1974); United States v.
Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515 (1974).
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be inappropriate. Instead, a search warrant requirement would strike
the right balance between the interests of law enforcement and the
individual privacy interests.
B.

New York Should Enact a Warrant Requirement for Stored
Electronic Communications

This Part argues that New York should enact a warrant
requirement for law enforcement access to stored electronic
communications rather than await guidance from the courts or
Congress. This conclusion is supported by the application of the
“reasonable expectations” test in Katz.
Moreover, a warrant
requirement strikes the appropriate balance between law
enforcement efficacy and personal privacy rights. Finally, requiring a
search warrant for stored electronic communications would eliminate
the outdated distinctions made in the federal framework,165 providing
clear guidance for all parties subject to the law.

1.

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Electronic
Communications

Any consideration of surveillance law requires an analysis under
the Fourth Amendment.166 The Fourth Amendment requires that
when an individual has a “reasonable expectation of privacy”167 in a
certain space, or in this case in certain personal communications, the
government must demonstrate probable cause and procure a search
warrant before it may conduct any lawful search or seizure.168
Therefore, it is necessary to consider whether individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in stored electronic
communications in contemplating whether to implement a search
warrant requirement.

165. See Bowman, supra note 32, at 831.
166. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”).
167. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Justice Harlan wrote that there
is a two-part inquiry in determining whether an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy. First, one must ask whether the individual’s conduct reflects a
subjective expectation of privacy. If the individual is found to have this subjective
expectation then the second inquiry is objective whether the actual expectation one
that society as a whole recognizes. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
168. See id. at 362.
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In Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan set out a two-part test to
determine whether the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement
officials to procure a search warrant before a search or seizure.169 The
first part asks whether the individual has an actual expectation of
privacy in this space or property. This inquiry is subjective. The
second part is an objective inquiry. It asks whether that expectation is
one that society finds reasonable.170 This Note asserts that individuals
enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in stored electronic
communications; thus, New York State should require law
enforcement officials to procure a search warrant before accessing
those communications.
In supporting that argument, this Subpart first discusses why the
third-party doctrine does not defeat the reasonable expectation test as
applied to stored electronic communications. Next, this Subpart
applies the Katz test to electronic communications. Specifically, it
explores the extent to which the reliance upon and pervasiveness of
electronic communications in today’s society supports the conclusion
that society has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in
these communications.

a. The Third-Party Doctrine Should Not Defeat Fourth
Amendment Protection of Stored Electronic Communications
The third-party doctrine is a central tenet of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. The doctrine holds that when an individual surrenders
an item (or in this case, a communication) to a third party, he forfeits
all Fourth Amendment rights in that information or
communication.171 In other words, the Supreme Court has found that
a person cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information he relates to a third-party.172 The argument applying the
third-party doctrine to stored electronic communications relies on the
transmission through, and storage of, these messages with third-party
service providers like ISPs and SMCs as discussed in Part I.
However, the nature of electronic communications makes the
application of the third-party doctrine to completely defeat Fourth
Amendment
protection
of
electronic
communications

169. Id. at 361.
170. Id. at 361–62.
171. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for
the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009).
172. See Kerr, supra note 171, at 563; see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 744; United States
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
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inappropriate.173 To begin, the third-party doctrine has traditionally
been used to defeat protection of “business records.”174 In a series of
cases, the Supreme Court has held that records of individuals’
transactions maintained by third-party business entities (like bank or
tax records) are not protected under the Fourth Amendment.175 But
electronic communications are nothing like business records; they are
private communications. Thus, applying the third-party doctrine to
defeat Fourth Amendment protection of these communications
would be inconsistent with the doctrine’s past application.176 The
contents of business records are turned over with the understanding
that the third party will need to review the contents of those records
in the course of its business activities. On the other hand, the use of
web-based email or cellular text messaging services does not
accompany the understanding that the service provider will need to
access the communications content.
The larger point, however, is that the third-party doctrine is simply
not compatible with the methods of modern communication. One of
the rationales of the doctrine’s application has been that individuals
have voluntarily assumed the risk that the third-party will disclose
that information.177
In the context of stored electronic
communications, however, it is very uncertain—in fact highly
doubtful—that writing an email or composing a text-message means
that a user is voluntarily assuming the risk that an ISP or cell phone
service will turn the content of those messages over to the
government.178

173. This conclusion is supported by many privacy scholars. See Bellia & Freiwald,
supra note 31, at 148; Kerr, supra note 171, at 563; see also Daniel J. Solove, Fourth
Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial
Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 753 (2005).
174. Miller, 425 U.S. at 441–43 (holding that the disclosure of records to a bank
defeats Fourth Amendment protection); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335
(1973) (holding that there is no expectation of privacy where records are turned over
to an accountant); see Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 31, at 145; see also Mulligan,
supra note 31, at 1576–82. The “business records” cases include Couch v. United
States, United States v. Miller, and Smith v. Maryland. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742
(holding that individuals have no expectation of privacy in the phone numbers they
dial because they know this information will be conveyed to the phone company).
175. See Mulligan, supra note 31, at 1562.
176. See Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 31, at 148–49 (noting that emails, unlike
business records, entail private communications); Mulligan, supra note 31, at 1581–
82.
177. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (“The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his
affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government.”).
178. See Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 31, at 148–49, 153–56.
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This point is reinforced by the fact that when the ECPA was passed
in 1986, electronic communications worked much differently than
they do today. Communicating via email in the 1980s involved
downloading email messages from a server to a home computer.179 If
law enforcement officials wished to access those stored messages,
they would have to access them through the individual’s home
computer, which would require a search warrant. Because this was
the dominant email system at the time, the SCA’s distinctions were
arguably drafted with this method in mind; in other words, almost all
email systems were considered ECS providers—they would transmit
the message from sender to receiver, storing the message
intermediately along the way.180 Additionally, Congress created the
category for RCS providers largely in light of the third-party doctrine.
At the time, the services of third-party service providers that offered
sophisticated remote storage were prohibitively expensive.181 Thus,
remote storage was a service offered to large businesses that needed
space to store their data. In this way, the services of RCS providers in
the 1980s resemble the “business records” cases.
The distinction the SCA makes between ECS and RCS providers is
not as clear now as it once was in 1986. Today, web-based email
providers like Gmail store all of their users’ messages in remote
storage, and in intermediate storage during transmission. In effect,
large businesses are no longer the only users of remote storage.
Instead most users of web-based email (and users of text-messages)
have their messages stored in remote storage.182 Therefore, while
application of the third-party doctrine may have comported with the
doctrine’s past in 1986 when the ECPA was enacted, the advances in
electronic communications technology since then casts serious doubt
on its application to stored electronic communications today.
Even Supreme Court justices have recently expressed disapproval
of application of the third-party doctrine to modern technology. In
her concurrence in United States v. Jones,183 Justice Sotomayor
stated,

179. See supra Part I.B.
180. See Robison, supra note 8, at 1205–06.
181. See id. at 1206–07.
182. See generally id.
183. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(holding that the government’s installation of a Global Positioning System tracking
device on a target’s vehicle to obtain information was a violation of the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights.)
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[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premises that an individual
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital
age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane
tasks.184

For these reasons, the third-party doctrine should not defeat the
reasonable expectation of privacy in stored electronic
communications.

b.

Society Has an Objectively Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in
Stored Electronic Communications
Under the two-prong test set out in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in

Katz, the compelled disclosure of stored electronic communications
should require law enforcement officials to procure a search warrant.
While the outcome under the subjective prong is case-dependent, the
analysis under the test’s objective prong dictates that access to stored
electronic communications should require a search warrant under the
Fourth Amendment.
The subjective prong of the Katz test’s application is not
predictable because it is necessarily a case specific inquiry, although
most individuals, if asked whether they expect that strangers would
read their email or text messages, would probably respond that they
do not. As to the second prong of the Katz test, in considering
whether there is an objective expectation of privacy in stored
electronic communications, a court must ask what society is entitled
to believe, even if society might perceive a certain mode of
communication as less than secure.185
Under the objective inquiry set out in Katz, it is important to
consider the growing role that electronic communications like text
messages and email messages play in society today.186 One way to
evaluate whether society has an objective expectation of privacy in
stored electronic communications is through surveys.
One recent study found that young adults are as likely to connect
with others electronically as they are in person.187 This study shows
that young adults today make a total of seventy-four electronic

184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 957 (citations omitted).
See Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 31, at 137–38.
See id. at 138–39.
See generally MILLER, supra note 10.
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contacts a month.188 The report compares the average electronic
contacts by young adults to personal contact with individuals and
concluded that the general trend is that young adults tend to
communicate via electronic networks just as often as they do in
person.189 This survey demonstrates that electronic communications
like texts and emails are beginning to replace traditional modes of
communications that already enjoy Fourth Amendment protection.
Similarly, another 2011 study found that 83% of American adults
own cell phones and 73% of them send and receive text messages.190
Moreover, 31% of text message users stated that they preferred to be
contacted via text messaging instead of talking on the phone.191
Perhaps most importantly, another recent study found that 68% of
adult Internet users say it is very important to them that no one, other
than those authorized to, have access to the content of their email.192
Additionally, the study found that 62% of adult Internet users say it is
very important to them that only the people with whom they
exchange emails have access to them.193 This survey demonstrates
that despite the potential understanding that electronic
communications are less secure, society still holds the belief that these
communications should be private.
These studies and statistics demonstrate the prevalence of and
reliance on electronic communications in our modern world. This
factor is important in determining the objective inquiry of the
“reasonable expectations” test because it demonstrates normative
reliance on electronic communications showing that society is entitled
to believe that these communications are private.194 This data is also
significant in that it tends to demonstrate that email (and to a lesser
extent text-messages) has replaced, to a certain degree, traditional
communications that courts have already determined carry a
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”195 The fact that electronic
188. See id. The term “electronic contacts” includes non-work emails, Facebook
visits, tweets, Skype visits, and the transmission of digital pictures. Additionally,
email messages accounted for over half of the seventy-four electronic contacts. Id.
189. See id. fig.1.
190. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 11, at 1.
191. Id.
192. PEW RESEARCH CTR., ANONYMITY, PRIVACY, AND SECURITY ONLINE 19
(2013).
193. Id.
194. See Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 31, at 138–39. See also Mulligan, supra note
31, at 1571–76.
195. See Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 31, at 138–39; see also Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 352, 360 (1967) (holding that there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy in conversations occurring over telephone); Silverman v. United States, 365

2014]

SHOW ME THE WARRANT

1441

communications have begun to replace these traditional forms of
communication suggests that society holds a belief in privacy in
electronic communications similar to the belief in the privacy of
traditional modes of communication.196
Under the Katz test, society has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in electronic communications and law enforcement access to
these communications should at least require a search warrant. This
conclusion is supported by significant scholarship197 and at least one
court decision.198

2.

Requiring a Search Warrant Will Not Over-Burden Law
Enforcement Officials

Requiring a search warrant under New York law for all stored
electronic communications would make it more difficult for law
enforcement to access certain types of stored electronic
communications. The current requirements are so weak, however,
that a search warrant will not overburden law enforcement and would
in fact be proportionate to the privacy interests at stake. Under the
current federal framework certain types of stored electronic
communications only require a subpoena or court order for the
government to access those communications.199
If New York
eliminates this distinction and replaces it with a warrant requirement
for all stored electronic communications, state law enforcement
agents would have to make a greater showing than they once did to
obtain stored electronic communications like emails and text
messages. The Department of Justice (DOJ), however, has recently
made statements that disapprove of the effectiveness of the

U.S. 505, 510 (1961) (holding that the interception of telephonic and in-person
conversations is a search under the Fourth Amendment).
196. See generally Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 31.
197. See generally sources cited supra note 31.
198. The Sixth Circuit recently held that there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy in emails and that government officials violate the Fourth Amendment when
they obtain emails without first obtaining a search warrant. See United States v.
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (2010).
199. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). For example, emails and text-messages that have
been “stored” for more than 180 days only require that the government obtain a
subpoena to access them. § 2703(b). See ECPA (Part I): Lawful Access to Stored

Content Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, &
Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (statements of
Rep. Scott) (“[A] warrant is required to access the content of e-mails while it waits in
electronic communications service storage to be read by the recipient, the instant the
e-mail is opened by the recipient, it may lose that high standard of protection and
become accessible by subpoena rather than by a warrant.”).
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distinctions created under the SCA in the face of modern modes of
communication.200 In fact, the DOJ has also admitted recently that
the argument for requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant
based on probable cause to compel disclosure of the contents of
stored e-mails “has considerable merit.”201

3. Requiring a Search Warrant for Access to Stored Electronic
Communications Would Eliminate Confusion Over the Distinctions
Contained in the SCA and Pressure Congress to Take Action
Two additional benefits to a warrant requirement for stored
electronic communications bear discussion. First, requiring a search
warrant for government access to stored electronic communications
in New York would eliminate all of the confusion created by the
SCA. A blanket search warrant requirement would mean that both
law enforcement officials and electronic communication users will
have a clear understanding of the law. The distinctions made as to
how long a message has been in storage or what type of
communication provider holds the message will no longer exist.
Instead, the sole inquiry when government officials seek stored emails
or texts from a service provider would be whether the government
has demonstrated probable cause.
While this clarity would certainly benefit the users of stored
electronic communications, it may benefit service providers even
more.202 Under the SCA, service providers are often placed in
difficult positions. They have the choice to either protect their users’
data (potentially facing obstruction of justice charges by refusing to
cooperate with investigators), or cooperate with subpoenas and court
orders and face losses to their business when users learn that their
communications are not secure. Since the SCA is an elaborate and
confusing framework and the courts have provided little guidance,
service providers often have to guess at which action will limit their

200. In her testimony at the Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Elana Tyrangiel, acting Assistant Attorney General, stated, “[The Department of
Justice] agree[s], for example, that there is no principal basis to treat e-mail less than
180 days old differently than e-mail more than 180 days old.” ECPA (Part I): Lawful

Access to Stored Content Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland
Security, & Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 14 (2013).
201. See id.
202. For more on the tech industry’s reaction to revelations of government
surveillance, see Claire Cain Miller, Angry Over U.S. Surveillance, Tech Giants
Bolster Defenses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/01/
technology/angry-over-us-surveillance-tech-giants-bolster-defenses.html?_r=1&.
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losses. Under a search warrant requirement, ISPs and SMCs who
provide services to users in New York would clearly understand those
situations when disclosure is compelled and those situations where
they must protect their users. In other words, this clarity would allow
service providers to predict outcomes and adjust their behavior
accordingly.
A blanket search warrant requirement would also allow the law to
be more flexible and adapt to rapidly changing technologies. The
SCA drafters arguably drew on the technology that existed then to
create the current surveillance framework.203 In effect, the SCA is full
of distinctions that may have made sense at the law’s inception, but
no longer fit in with today’s modern modes of electronic
communication. A search warrant requirement, devoid of any minute
distinctions, would simply hold that government access to any and all
stored electronic communications would require a search warrant. As
technology changes and evolves the question will become whether a
given message is a “stored electronic communication.” This question
can be resolved by courts and will not require legislatures to revise
the law every time that society advances.
Finally, if New York implements a blanket search warrant
requirement for government access to New Yorkers’ emails and text
messages, it is possible that Congress would be pressured to do the
same on the federal level. New York may serve as an example of how
such an amendment would work and perhaps relieve uncertainty for
Congress. Moreover, the more states that take action the harder it
becomes for Congress to ignore. Since the Snowden scandal, over
two-dozen privacy laws have been passed in more than ten states.204
These new laws range from laws limiting how schools can collect their
student’s data to determining whether police must procure a warrant
in order to use cell-site location data.205
IV. THE PROPOSED REVISION
The difference between the plain language of the statute and the
New York courts’ interpretation of the statute gives New York the
perfect opportunity to clarify the law. In addition, New York’s strong

203. See supra Part I.B.
204. See Somni Sengupta, No U.S. Action, So States Move on Privacy Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/technology/no-us-action-sostates-move-on-privacy-law.html.
205. See id.
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history of protecting its citizens’ privacy206 makes it the optimal state
to blaze the trail (along with Texas) in protecting Americans from
government surveillance of their stored electronic communications.
The following proposals would clarify that New York government
officials do not need to obtain an eavesdropping warrant to access
New Yorker’s stored electronic communications. However, this Note
also proposes changes that would require New York officials to
obtain a search warrant upon a showing of probable cause in order to
access these communications.
A. Changes to the Language of New York Penal Law Section
250.00 and New York Criminal Procedure Law Section 700.05
The proposed revision to the New York eavesdropping law could
be effected very easily. New York’s penal law207 currently provides
the definition of “intercepting or accessing of an electronic
communication” as follows:
“Intercepting or accessing of an electronic communication” and
“intentionally intercepted or accessed” means the intentional
acquiring, receiving, collecting, overhearing, or recording of an
electronic communication, without the consent of the sender or
intended receiver thereof, by means of any instrument, device or
equipment, except when used by a telephone company in the
ordinary course of its business or when necessary to protect the
rights or property of such company.”208

The following represents the proposed changes that could be made
to the language of the statute to give it the desired effect:
“Intercepting or accessing of an electronic communication” and
“intentionally intercepted or accessed” means the intentional
acquiring, receiving, collecting, overhearing, or recording of an
electronic communication, while the communication is between
the point of origin and the point of reception and without the

206. New York courts have declined to implement doctrines in the field of search
and seizure that have been adopted by other states because these doctrines intrude
too greatly on personal privacy. See People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298 (N.Y. 1993)
(rejecting the “plain touch” doctrine for so-called Terry searches for weapons in part
because the intrusion upon personal privacy is too great); see also People v. Torres,
543 N.E.2d 61 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that police officers need more than reasonable
suspicion to search the inside of a vehicle for weapons).
207. It is important to note that amending this definition in the penal law would
also affect the criminal prohibition on eavesdropping, criminalizing only the
interception of in-transit electronic communication under section 250 of the New
York Penal Law. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.00 (McKinney 2013).
208. PENAL LAW § 250.00(6).
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consent of the sender or intended receiver thereof, by means of any
instrument, device or equipment, except when used by a telephone
company in the ordinary course of its business or when necessary to
protect the rights or property of such company.”

Additionally, the definition of “eavesdropping” contained in
section 700.05 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law would also
need to be revised slightly to make the two statutes compatible. The
statute currently reads as follows:
“Eavesdropping” means “wiretapping”, “mechanical overhearing
of conversation” or the “intercepting or accessing of an electronic
communication” . . . .

The following represents the changes to this definition:
“Eavesdropping” means “wiretapping”, “mechanical overhearing
of conversation” or the “intercepting or accessing of an electronic
communication” . . . .

These revisions would put the proposed solution into effect,
clarifying that New York’s eavesdropping law does not require an
eavesdropping warrant for law enforcement access to stored
electronic communications. The statute’s language could also be
revised in a few other minor respects are beyond the scope of this
Note.209
These revisions are not likely to be controversial. No courts have
held that stored electronic communications require an eavesdropping
warrant.210 In fact, courts considering the question have found that

209. This author would also recommend a few other alterations to the statute that
would simply modernize the language to bring it up to speed with current technology.
For example, one change that may be helpful would be to eliminate the term
“telephonic or telegraphic communication” and replace it with the federal law
equivalent, “wire communication.” Compare N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.05
(McKinney 2013), and PENAL LAW § 250.00(3), with 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2012). In
fact, an amendment made to the law shortly after the ECPA was passed confusingly
uses the term “wire communication,” even though that term is not defined anywhere
in New York’s statute. See CRIM. PROC. § 700.05(4). However, this revision will not
be without practical effect. If New York adopts the ECPA’s language here and
replaces the term “telephonic or telegraphic communication” with “wire
communication” that will mean that stored voicemail messages will be excluded from
the eavesdropping statute as well. This Note would argue that this exclusion is
appropriate for all of the reasons why other stored electronic communications should
be excluded from New York’s eavesdropping statute. Therefore, the phrase “such
term includes any electronic storage of such communications” contained in New
York Penal Law section 250.00(3) should also be eliminated since that language is
meant to expressly include voicemail in the definition of “telephonic
communication.”
210. See supra Part II.
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New York’s statute mirrors the federal law.211 In effect, this revision
would simply bring New York’s statute into line with the Wiretap
Act, clarifying that law enforcement officials are only required to
obtain an eavesdropping warrant for in-transit communications. It
may seem from the language proposed to be omitted from the statute
that the revision will take away certain protections, but in reality it
will simply codify the law as it already exists in the courts.
B. Proposed Statute Requiring a Search Warrant for Law
Enforcement Access to Stored Electronic Communications
In considering how to implement a warrant requirement in the
state of New York, this Note has the advantage of a recent example.
Texas Governor Rick Perry signed a bill requiring a search warrant
for state law enforcement access to any and all stored email messages
in the state of Texas on June 14, 2013.212 The new law213 revised
various provisions of the criminal procedure code to implement the
changes.214 Specifically, the bill revised Texas’s statute governing the
issuance of search warrants to add the following language:
(a) A search warrant may be issued to search for and seize:
...
(13) electronic customer data held in electronic storage, including
the contents of and records and other information related to a wire
communication or electronic communication held in electronic
storage.
(b) For purposes of Subsection (a)(13), “electronic communication,”
“electronic storage,” and “wire communication” have the meaning
assigned by Article 18.20, and “electronic customer data” has the
meaning assigned by Article 18.21.215

Additionally, the Texas legislature amended the definition of
“electronic storage”216 to read:

211. See generally People v. Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Crim. Ct. 2012); Gurevich v.
Gurevich, 886 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 2009); Boudakian v. Boudakian, N.Y. L.J. Dec.
26, 2008 (Sup. Ct. 2008); Moore v. Moore, N.Y. L.J. Aug. 14, 2008 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
212. See Bill: HB 2268, TEX. LEGISLATURE ONLINE, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/
BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=83R&Bill=HB2268 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
See generally Sullivan, supra note 19.
213. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.02 (West 2013).
214. See H.B. 2268, 83rd Leg. (Tex. 2013). Specifically, the bill revised articles
18.02, 18.06–.07, and 18.20–.21 of Texas’s Code of Criminal Procedure.
215. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.02 (West 2013).
216. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.20(20) (West 2013).
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“Electronic storage” means any storage of electronic customer
data in a computer, computer network, or computer system,
regardless of whether the data is subject to recall, further
manipulation, deletion or transmission and includes any storage of a
wire or electronic communication by an electronic communications
service or a remote computing service.217

The effects of these changes is to make clear that a search warrant
is required for government access to any and all stored electronic
communications.218 The changes to the definition of “electronic
storage” would clarify that a search warrant is required regardless of
whether or not the message is being temporarily stored or
permanently stored and regardless of whether the message is stored
with an ECS or an RCS. In so doing, Texas has eliminated the
distinctions created under the SCA. In Texas, law enforcement
officials are required to obtain a search warrant for messages that are
temporarily stored on their way to the recipient. Law enforcement
will also need a warrant to access unopened emails and text messages.
Texas government officials are even required to obtain a warrant
before reading messages that have been read and remain in storage
with service providers’ servers for long periods of time.
Texas also included a provision stating that a search warrant for
electronic communications could be issued regardless of where the
customer data was held, whether it was within Texas or another
state.219
Similarly, the New York legislature could also revise the law to
make it clear that a warrant is required for the search of stored
electronic communications. But revising New York’s law may require
more extensive amendments. For example, the term “electronic
storage” does not appear at all in section 700 of New York’s criminal
procedure law and while the term appears in section 250 of the penal
law, it is not defined.220 Therefore, simply adding “access to stored
electronic communications” to the list of evidence that require search
warrants would not be sufficient since under New York’s current law

217. Id.
218. In Texas, stored electronic communications also include stored voicemail
messages. Therefore, for access to these stored voicemail messages, law enforcement
officials must obtain a search warrant. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
18.20(20) (including in the definition of “electronic storage” “storage of a
wire . . . communication by an electronic communications service or a remote
computing service.”)
219. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.21(5)(a).
220. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.00 (McKinney 2013); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
700.05 (McKinney 2013).
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it is unclear what stored electronic communications are. Regardless
of how the amendment to New York law is formed, a definition of
“electronic storage” in section 250, section 700 or elsewhere is
necessary.
Notice is another issue to consider.
Recently, California’s
legislature approved a bill221 that was very similar to Texas’s
amendment. It would have required law enforcement officials in
California to obtain a search warrant prior to accessing stored
electronic communications like emails and text messages.222 Unlike
Texas, California’s bill would have required state law enforcement to
notify email account holders that a search of their account had taken
place.223 Due to these heightened notice requirements, California
Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the bill.224 Under the SCA, one
advantage to law enforcement officials is that if they obtain a search
warrant for access to stored electronic communications, they do not
have to notify the suspect.225 Requiring that law enforcement officials
first obtain a search warrant and then notify the suspect would
perhaps overburden them, disrupting the balance struck by a warrant
requirement. In considering a revision to its surveillance statute, the
New York legislature should assess whether a notice requirement
would tip the scale too far in favor of personal privacy interests and
too far against government interests.
Overall, a blanket search warrant requirement would solve many
of the problems and eliminate much of the inherent confusion under
New York’s current domestic surveillance law. While an amendment
would not protect New Yorkers from surveillance by federal
officials,226 it would ensure that New Yorkers’ emails and text
messages are not accessed without probable cause by state law
enforcement officials and may have the added bonus of providing
pressure on Congress to take action.

221. See S.B. 467, 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2013).
222. See Jaikumar Vijayan, Calif. Governor Vetoes Email Privacy Legislation for
Third Time, COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.computerworld.com/s/
article/9243227/Calif._governor_vetoes_email_privacy_legislation_for_third_time.
223. See id.
224. See Letter from Edmund G. Brown, Governor of California, to State Senate
(Oct. 12, 2013) (“The bill, however, imposes new notice requirements that go beyond
those required by federal law and could impede ongoing criminal investigations. I do
not think that is wise.”).
225. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
226. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(a) (2012) (specifying that the ECPA governs the
interception of communications by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or other
federal agency).
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CONCLUSION
Americans have outgrown the nation’s surveillance laws. The
current federal framework does not adequately protect electronic
messages in light of the growing prevalence of these modes
communication. Change is necessary. Given the delay in legislation
at the federal level, states should take action to protect their citizens.
The current conflict between the plain language of the eavesdropping
statute in New York and the recent interpretations of that statute by
the courts presents the New York legislature with the opportunity to
amend its statute and provide its citizens with greater protection from
government surveillance. In so doing, New York will not only afford
its citizens better protection from state government surveillance but
will also apply pressure to lawmakers on the federal level.
Excluding stored electronic communications from New York’s
surveillance statute and implementing a search warrant requirement
for these communications strikes the appropriate balance between
individual privacy interests and law enforcement efficacy. This
amendment will ensure that the emails and text messages of innocent
New Yorkers—like Amy, Joe, and Michael, described above—will be
safe from prying government eyes. However, New York officials can
still gain access to the emails and text messages of New Yorkers in the
course of their investigations upon a showing of probable cause.

